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Abstract 
As Japan’s financial system moves toward a more market oriented one, depositor 
discipline is expected to play a larger role in the monitoring of the country’s banks. 
Relying on detailed survey data on households’ bank switching behavior matched with 
banks’ financial data, we examine households’ response to bank risk and different 
deposit insurance schemes. We find that bank switching in response to risk was more 
frequent in 2001 than in 1996 and that households’ choice of bank provides an adequate 
reflection of banks’ financial health. We also examine the determinants of households’ 
knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and find that income, the amount of 
households’ financial assets, and educational attainment are all significant factors. What 
is more, households’ extent of knowledge regarding the deposit insurance scheme was 
an important determinant of bank switching behavior. The results suggest that depositor 
discipline appears to work and could play an important supplementary role in 
monitoring the banking sector.  
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1.  Introduction 
    
A central characteristic of Japan’s post-war financial system has been the tight 
control exercised by the government authorities over financial institutions. Bank 
monitoring was squarely in the hands of the financial authorities and under the so-called 
“convoy system,” troubled banks would be quietly merged with stronger rivals. Trusting 
their government to guarantee the safety of their deposits, the public grew indifferent to 
banks’ financial conditions and the potential risk to their savings.  
However, financial deregulation begun in the 1980s seriously undermined this 
system, exposing a series of banking scandals. Financial sector problems further 
escalated as a result of mounting non-performing loans in the wake of the burst of the 
bubble economy, culminating in a full-blown banking sector crisis towards the end of 
the 1990s that saw the collapse of a number of banks and ushered in the end of the 
“convoy system.”  
Together with the “big bang” financial sector reforms enacted in the late 1990s, 
these developments have gradually edged Japan’s financial sector toward a system 
where market discipline is to gradually supplement or replace government monitoring 
of the banking sector. This shift implies that bank customers play a potentially important 
role in the monitoring of financial institutions through the discipline they can impose on 
banks by transferring assets from institutions that are perceived to be risky and 
inefficient toward those with sound balance sheets and efficient management. In Japan, 
this mechanism had been largely irrelevant, initially as a result of the “convoy system” 
that implicitly ruled out the possibility of bank failure, and then, as the financial crisis 
deepened, the introduction of emergency measures in 1996 that suspended the so-called 
“pay-off” scheme that capped the amount of deposits covered by the deposit insurance 
scheme.  
However, as the financial sector returned to stability and banks made progress in the 
disposal of non-performing loans, the government decided, in 2001, to gradually 
remove the blanket insurance of deposits by partially reinstating the “pay-off” scheme 
(the cap on the amount of deposits covered by the deposit insurance scheme) on certain 
types of deposits in 2002.
1 The Financial Services Agency explicitly states that the aim 
is to improve the efficiency of the financial sector by forcing depositors to shoulder part 
of the potential risk (FSA (N.D.)). 
                                                  
1 The removal of the full guarantee on bank deposits was subject to substantial political wrangling and, in 
the event, staggered over several years. While the cap on some types of deposits was reintroduced in 2002, 
other types of deposits continued to be fully covered until April 2005. For details on the timing of the 
reinstatement of the “pay-off” scheme for the different types of deposits, see NLI (2004).       3
Yet, if depositor discipline is indeed to supplement or substitute for government 
monitoring of the banking sector, depositors must be sufficiently aware and sensitive to 
the risk of bank failure and respond accordingly to such risk. The aim of this paper is to 
examine whether this is indeed the case by looking at depositors’ bank switching 
behavior. We do so by taking advantage of a rich and unique set of household-level data 
from the NEEDS-RADAR Financial Behavior Survey (Kinyu Kodo Chosa) available 
for the years 1996 and 2001. What makes this survey unique is that it is the only one 
that provides household-level data which can be matched with data on financial 
institution. As far as we are aware, ours is the first study to utilize household-level 
information on bank switching from “old” to “new” banks and combine this with banks’ 
financial data. This integrated data structure allows us to examine what determines 
depositors’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme as well as their bank switching 
behavior and, further, to analyze whether such behavior adequately reflects banks’ 
financial health.    
A substantial number of empirical studies have looked at the role of market 
discipline in the financial sector (Flannery (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002)). 
They can be divided into two groups according to the methodology adopted. The first 
focuses on cross-country differences in governmental approaches to bank regulation and 
supervision in order to examine the effectiveness of market discipline in ensuring 
banking sector stability (e.g., Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2004), Hosono, Iwaki and Tsuru (2004)). The second and more common 
methodology is to utilize data on financial institutions and examine the relationship 
between changes in the amount of deposits and risk variables (e.g., Goldberg and 
Hudgins (2002), Park and Peristiani (1998), Maechler and McDill (2003) using U.S. 
data and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) using data on Argentina, Chile and 
Mexico). There are also a number of studies on Japan following this methodology, 
which provide evidence suggesting that depositor discipline has worked in the case of 
smaller institutions (Murata and Hori (2004), Hori, Ito and Murata (2005)). 
  However, these methodologies suffer from a number of shortcomings. First, 
deposit growth and deposit interest rates, which are frequently used as the dependent 
variable in such studies, are influenced by bank behavior as well as depositors’ behavior 
and it is often difficult to determine the degree to which deposits are shifted in response 
to risk perceptions.
2 Second, bank-switching behavior is non-linear and often related to 
                                                  
2 For example, rather reflecting bank switching behavior in response to risk, a decrease in the amount of 
deposits may be the result of banks’ attempt to improve their capital adequacy ratio to meet BIS standards 
or household decisions unrelated to changes in financial institutions’ riskiness.  4
the public awareness of risk created by reporting in the news. If this is the case, then a 
direct examination of household responses to risk is more instructive. And third, 
household heterogeneity should be taken into account. Switching behavior is likely to 
be influenced by factors such as household income or assets, educational background, 
attitudes toward risk, and the regional density of financial institutions. If the 
government’s aim is to strengthen depositor discipline, it would be useful to know what 
types of households are more sensitive to bank risk and hence likely to transfer deposits 
to safer institutions.  
Our data allow us to investigate these questions. They also allow us to explore the 
connections between household characteristics, the extent of households’ knowledge 
regarding the deposit insurance scheme, and the likelihood that they would switch banks. 
Comparing the results of the 1996 and the 2001 survey, our data indicate that, against 
the backdrop of the crisis in Japan’s banking sector during the late 1990s, households 
became much more aware of the deposit insurance scheme and more sensitive to bank 
risk. What is more, households responded accordingly by switching banks, and a 
comparison of households’ previous bank and their new bank suggests that such 
switching behavior is an adequate reflection of banks’ financial health.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of our data set. Section 3 then examines bank switching behavior in 1996 and 
2001 and combines this information with data on banks’ financial condition. Section 4 
explores what determines depositors’ extent of knowledge of the deposit insurance 
scheme and how this knowledge affects bank switching behavior. The final section 
summarizes our findings and considers the policy implication. 
 
 
2.  Description of the Data 
 
This study takes advantage of the comprehensive household-level data of the 
NEEDS-RADAR Financial Behavior Survey (Kinyu Kodo Chosa) conducted annually 
by Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc. The sample consists of randomly chosen households 
within a 40 kilometer radius of the center of Tokyo with household heads aged between 
25 and 69.
3 The survey is cross-sectional and is based on 5,000 questionnaires sent out 
annually, providing information on household asset portfolios as well as detailed 
household demographics. The survey consists of a set of standard questions that are 
                                                  
3 The survey thus includes households from parts of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba and Saitama prefectures. 
The 2001 survey also covers parts of Ibaraki prefecture.   5
asked every year and a set of topical questions asked only in certain years.     
     In this study, we use the surveys conducted in 1996 and 2001 since in both years the 
survey contains detailed data on household awareness of and responses to changes in 
the deposit insurance scheme including information on which bank households used. 
The sample size for 1996 is 2,759 households (response rate: 55.2 percent) and 2,906 
households for 2001 (response rate: 58.1 percent). After removing observations for 
which data necessary for our investigation are not available, the sample size falls to 
2,445 households for 1996 and 2,351 for 2001.    
     Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables for 1996 and 2001. First, 
we look at household demographics. The average age of the household head in the two 
survey is about 45 to 47 years and the average annual household income is around 7 
million yen. The share of households with detached houses is more than 70%. About 
90% of heads of household are employed. As regards educational attainment, high-
school graduates and university graduates each make up about 40 percent. The amount 
of total financial assets is slightly more than 10 million yen in both years. If we 
decompose household assets into their components, we see that the amount of time 
deposits decreased while that of ordinary bank deposits and postal savings deposits 
increased between 1996 and 2001. This shift is partly explained by the timing of the 
surveys. The 2001 survey followed the government’s decision to reinstate the deposit 
insurance cap on time deposits in 2002 and households sensitive to bank risk were 
likely to shift their time deposits to ordinary bank accounts or postal savings accounts, 
which continued to be fully protected. Lastly, the most popular reason for the choice of 
a financial institution was the interest rate offered.  
  We rely on two sources for the bank financial data that we use in Section 4 to 
match the household survey data with banks’ financial condition. The first is Zenkoku 
Ginko Zaimu Shohyo Bunseki (Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks) 
published biannually by the Japanese Bankers Association for all financial institutions 
except the shinkin banks (credit unions); the second is Zenkoku Shinyo Kinko Zaimu 
Shohyo (Financial Statements of Shinkin Banks in Japan) by Financial Book 
Consultants, Ltd. for the credit unions. These two sources readily provide all the 
financial data we require, such as the liquidity asset ratio, the non-performing loan ratio, 
etc.  
 
3.  Deposit shifting behavior and financial statement of financial institutions  
 
We begin our investigation by examining the bank switching behavior of households  6
in 1996 and 2001. In the next step, we then match the information on which banks 
households withdrew their deposits from and shifted them to with data on the financial 
condition of those banks in order to explore whether this switching behavior is in accord 
with the degree of risk associated with each of the financial institutions. 
It should be noted that the questions asked in the two surveys were slightly different. 
In the 1996 survey, respondents were asked whether they were aware of what types of 
deposits were insured under the deposit insurance scheme.
4 The second question asked 
households whether they were considering to switch banks due to concerns regarding 
the safety of their bank. The third question, finally, asked respondents to indicate the 
name of the financial institution they used to bank with (we call this their “old” bank) 
and the name of the bank to which they transferred (were considering to transfer) their 
deposits (we refer to this as their “new” bank).
5 This question was also applicable to 
households which switched banks in response to bank risk even if they were not aware 
of the deposit insurance scheme.  
In contrast, the 2001 survey asked households whether they were aware that the full 
coverage of time deposits was going to be lifted in April 2002 and the “pay-off” scheme 
capping the amount of deposits insured at 10 million yen (plus accumulated interest) 
reinstated.
6  The second question asked households how they had responded (were 
planning to respond) to this change, i.e., whether they had switched (or were 
considering to switch) banks. The third question, finally, was identical to that of the 
1996 survey, asking from and to which banks households had transferred (were 
planning to transfer) their deposits. In both surveys, the names of individual “old” and 
“new” banks are available for city banks, regional banks, trust banks, bond issuing 
banks, second-tier regional banks, but not for financial institutions categorized as credit 
unions, credit cooperatives, labor credit associations, agricultural cooperative, or foreign 
banks.  
      Table 2 shows the evidence on bank switching behavior based on these questions. 
First, we should note that the proportion of households that shifted or were thinking 
about shifting their deposits to another bank in response to risk increased from 8.6 
percent in 1996 to 21.9 percent in 2001. This implies that following the financial crisis 
                                                  
4 It is important to note that although the survey was conducted in the autumn of 1996, the actual survey 
question still referred to the system in effect before the introduction of the blanked insurance of deposits 
in the spring of that year. 
5 If households switched deposits from more than one “old” bank to more than one “new” bank (i.e. from 
bank A to bank B and from bank C to bank D), they were asked to provide information on the transfer 
involving the largest amount of deposits.  
6 The cap on ordinary deposits was scheduled to be reimposed a year later, in April 2003, but this was 
subsequently postponed to April 2005.    7
during the second half of the 1990s, households became more sensitive and responsive 
to bank risk. If we divide our sample households into those with less and those with 
more than 10 million yen in financial assets, i.e., the amount corresponding to the 
deposit insurance cap before the introduction of the emergency measure, we observe a 
clear difference in switching behavior, with households with financial assets in excess 
of 10 million yen being considerably more inclined to switch banks in response to risk
7 
In the 1996 survey, the share of households which switched or were considering to 
switch banks was 13.1 percent for households with more than 10 million yen in 
financial assets and 5.6 percent for those with less than that amount. In contrast, in the 
2001 survey, these shares were 38.3 percent and 9.9 percent, respectively. This result is 
in line with the expectation that households with financial assets in excess of the deposit 
insurance cap are more sensitive to bank risk than households whose financial assets fall 
below this threshold.    
  We now turn to the pattern in bank switching behavior in terms of what types of 
financial institutions households turned away from and which they turned to. Looking 
first at the type of financial institutions that households shifted their deposits to, we find 
that, in 1996, in more than 80 percent of the cases, the “new bank” was the post office 
or a city bank, with the former attracting 43.6 percent of those transferring their deposits 
to another financial institution and the latter attracting 40.3 percent. A similar pattern 
can be observed in the 2001 survey: 40.9 of those transferring their deposits chose the 
post office, while 41.7 percent opted for a city bank.  
  Next, examining which type of financial institutions savers shunned, we find that 
in both surveys, none of the households switched their deposits away from the post 
office. Apart from this, however, we find large differences in the 1996 and the 2001 
survey in terms of what type of financial institutions fell out of favor. In 1996, about 36 
percent of households that moved their assets did so from a city bank and more than 20 
percent did so from credit cooperatives. In contrast, in 2001, in about 60 percent of the 
cases the “old” financial institution was a city bank and the favored destination of 
deposits withdrawn from city banks were, in roughly equal measure, another city bank 
or the post office. What is more, using Moody’s credit rating, we find that half of the 
households that switched to another city bank chose the highest-rated, the Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi with a “D” credit rating, and another half chose banks with an “E+” 
rating, while only one household chose a bank with an “E” rating, the lowest on 
Moody’s scale from A to E.  
                                                  
7 To save space, we omit the table showing bank switching behavior categorized by the amount of 
household financial assets.  8
  In sum, we find that bank switching behavior in response to risk was more 
frequent in 2001 than in 1996. In more than 80 percent of the cases in which depositors 
switched banks, the “new” financial institution was a city bank or the post office. And 
while in 1996, the “old” bank in 21 percent of the cases was a credit union and in 36 
percent of the cases a city bank, in 2001, the share of credit unions was only around 10 
percent, whereas the share of city banks was almost 60 percent. In other words, by 2001, 
households had not only become more sensitive to bank risk overall, but also much 
more discerning with regard to the safety of individual city banks.  
  Next, we examine the relationship between bank switching behavior and banks’ 
financial condition. Concretely, we test whether significant differences in “old” and 
“new” banks’ financial condition can be observed. If households’ choice of bank is 
based on the perceived risk, then we would expect their “new” bank to be in better 
financial shape than their “old” bank. We therefore match our information on which 
banks depositors shifted their assets from and to with indicators of the banks’ financial 
health, using four different indicators.
8 The first is the liquidity-asset ratio, defined as 
the share of the sum of cash, deposits and government bonds in total assets. A financial 
institution with a higher share of liquid assets is in a better position to cope with large 
amounts of withdrawals and is therefore healthier. The second indicator is the operating 
profit ratio, defined as the operating profit divided by total assets. The third indicator is 
the nonperforming loan ratio, defined as the amount of risk-adjusted nonperforming 
loans out of total loans,
9 while the fourth is the capital-asset ratio.
10  
Furthermore, we compare the growth and amount of deposits and the amount of 
total assets. If depositors are sensitive to risk and switch banks, then we would expect 
deposits at the “new” banks to grow faster than those at the “old” banks. If this is indeed 
the case, our findings would be consistent with preceding studies which found a 
negative correlation between bank risk and deposit growth. We should also note that 
larger financial institutions (i.e., those with a larger deposit base) are not necessarily 
                                                  
8 These indicators are the same as those employed by Murata and Hori (2004).  
9 Risk-adjusted loans are officially defined as the sum of loans to legally bankrupt borrowers, loans in 
arrears by 6 months or more, loans in arrears by 3 to 6 months, and restructured loans. Data on risk-
adjusted loans are not publicly available and we need to estimate these figures. Due to a lack of all the 
necessary data, risk-adjusted loans for 1995 and 1996 are calculated as the sum of loans to legally 
bankrupt borrowers and loans in arrears by 6 months or more.   
10 In this analysis, all except one of the shinkin banks are excluded because they cannot be identified. 
Also excluded are credit cooperatives, labor credit associations as well as several types of financial 
institutions which do not fall under the deposit insurance scheme, such as foreign banks, agricultural co-
operatives, securities companies, life-insurance companies and Japan Post. To protect deposits, 
agricultural co-ops have to join the Agricultural and Fishery Cooperative Savings Insurance Corporation, 
securities companies are members of the Investor Protection Fund, and life-insurance companies join the 
Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation of Japan.  9
healthier. Therefore, if we find that customers’ new banks are both significantly larger 
and in better financial shape, we can unequivocally say that depositors are sensitive to 
banks’ financial health and switch their deposits accordingly. If, however, depositors 
switch their savings to larger banks, but no significant difference in “old” and “new” 
banks’ financial health is observed, this would indicate that depositors believe that 
certain banks are “too big to fail.”  
Table 3 tests the significance in the means of above-mentioned financial 
indicators and deposit growth. Because the survey does not allow us to determine when 
households switched banks, we proceed by comparing the data for households’ “old” 
and “new” bank both in 1995 and in 1996, where the labels “old” and “new” are based 
on the information of the 1996 survey.
11 Doing so, we find that “new” banks have 
higher capital asset ratios, larger amounts of total assets and lower non-performing loan 
ratios. In other words, “new” banks, i.e., banks that households switch their deposits to, 
are financially sounder and have larger assets.  The differences in these indicators are 
statistically significant.  
Next, comparing these indicators for the years 2000 and 2001 and using 
information on households’ “old” and “new” banks based on the 2001 survey, we 
observe that customers’ new banks have significantly higher ratios of liquid assets, 
higher capital asset ratios and larger amounts of total assets. In other words, customers’ 
new banks are financially healthier and are larger in terms of their financial assets. 
Reflecting the fact that the cap on time deposits was to be reintroduced in April 2002, 
we also observe that time deposits at “old” banks shrank significantly faster than those 
at “new” banks.  On the other hand, the difference in the growth of ordinary deposits is 
not significant. 
  In sum, we find that households’ “new” banks – banks to which they switched 
their deposits – were significantly healthier in terms of their liquidity and capital asset 
ratios, had greater amounts of total assets, and experienced a greater increase in total 
deposits and a smaller contraction in time deposits. Our findings on household bank 
switching behavior thus confirm preceding studies on the role of banks’ financial health 
and deposit growth. In the next section, we examine the determinants of bank switching 
by looking at household characteristics.  
 
4.  Households’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and bank switching 
                                                  
11 Concretely, the averages for “old” and “new” banks were calculated as follows: Using the information 
on households’ “old” and “new” banks, e.g., Household 1: OLD=A, NEW=B; Household 2: OLD=D, 
NEW=A; Household 3: OLD=C, NEW=A, the average values for “old” banks consist of the financial 
data for A, D, and C, while that of the “new” banks consist of the data for B, A, and A.    10
 
     This section explores what determines households’ knowledge of the deposit 
insurance scheme and bank switching behavior. In contrast with the analyses in the 
previous section, we also include households in our analysis which did not switch banks.  
      First, we examine households’ extent of knowledge regarding the deposit insurance 
scheme. The 1996 survey asked respondents whether they knew which types of deposits 
were protected under the deposit insurance scheme, while the 2001 survey asked 
households whether they knew about the reintroduction of the cap on certain types of 
deposits. Table 4 provides the results of the two surveys. The results of the 1996 survey 
show that only 7 percent of households knew the detailed contents of the deposit 
insurance scheme, but more than a half at least knew of the scheme. In contrast, the 
2001 survey shows that a quarter of households had detailed knowledge of the 
reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap, its timing and the types of deposits 
concerned, while about 70 percent at least knew that a cap of some kind was to be 
reimposed. Although the questions differed in the two surveys, we may conclude that 
depositors were more aware of the deposit insurance scheme after the financial crisis in 
the late 1990s. Moreover, households with better knowledge of the deposit insurance 
scheme were more inclined to switch banks. The share of households in 1996 that were 
well informed about the deposit insurance scheme and switched banks was 16 percent, 
while in 2001 that figure increased to 48 percent. In other words, the share of 
households with better knowledge increased between 1996 and 2001 and the share 
among these that switched banks also increased. 
     Next, we employ an ordered probit model to explore the determinants of knowledge 
of the deposit insurance scheme. The specification is as follows:  
 
i i i i i i i i X X X X X X Y ε β β β β β β α + + + + + + + = 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1                           (1) 
 
where i denotes the ith household. 
Yi=2  if a household had detailed knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme (in the 
1996 survey, those who knew which types of deposits were covered by the 
deposit insurance scheme and, in the 2001 survey, those who knew when the  
deposit insurance cap was to be reintroduced and what types of deposits were 
affected);  
Yi=1  if a household knew of the deposit insurance scheme in the 1996 survey or the of 
the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap in the 2001 survey; 
Yi=0  if a household did not know about deposit insurance scheme in the 1996 survey or  11
about the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap in the 2001 survey;  
X1: quadratic age of the household head;  
X2: tenancy status (detached house owner=1);  
X3: employment status of the household head (employed=1);  
X4: educational attainment of the household head;  
X5: annual household income; 
X6: total amount of household financial assets; and 
i ε : well-behaved error term. 
     Table 5 reports the estimation results based on the specification above. Both in the 
regression for 1996 and that for 2001, we find that the coefficients on income, 
educational attainment and the total amount of household financial assets are positive 
and significant. In addition, the coefficients on the age of the head of household, the 
dummy for households owning a detached house, and the dummy for being employed 
are also positive and significant. These results suggest that households with a higher 
level of income, greater financial assets and higher educational attainment were more 
knowledgeable regarding the deposit insurance scheme or the reintroduction of the 
deposit insurance cap. 
Further, we investigate whether households’ knowledge regarding the deposit 
insurance scheme or the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap were more likely to 
switch banks than households that knew little or nothing about these schemes. We again 
employ an ordered probit model:  
 
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
X X X X X
X X X X X X X Z
ε β β β β
β β β β β β α
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
7 7 62 62 61 61 5 52 52
5 51 51 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1
) * (
) * (
                          (2)  
 
where i denotes the ith household. 
Zi=2  if a household actually switched banks in response to risk; 
Zi=1  if a household was considering to switch banks in response to risk; and 
Zi=0  if a household did not consider it necessary to switch banks.
12 
 
  In addition to the explanatory variables already employed in (1), we use 
X51: if a household has ordinary deposits in excess of 10 million yen; 
X52: if a household has time deposits in excess of 10 million yen;  
X61: if a household has detailed knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme (in the 1996 
                                                  
12 In contrast with the 1996 survey, the 2001 survey also offered respondents the option to answer they 
were “uncertain” whether they would switch banks. We removed households that chose this answer from 
the sample used for this regression.  12
survey, those who knew which types of deposits were covered by the deposit 
insurance scheme and, in the 2001 survey,  those who knew when the deposit 
insurance cap was to be reintroduced and what types of deposits were 
affected);  
X62: if a household did not know about the deposit insurance scheme in the 1996 survey 
or about the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap in the 2001 survey; 
and  
X7: households’ reason for choosing a particular financial institution.
13   
 
     Table 6(a) reports the results for this specification based on the 1996 survey and 
Table 6(b) those based on the 2001 survey. We observe some interesting results. First, 
the “knowledge” dummy had some effect on bank switching behavior. Table 6(a) shows 
that households that did not know about the deposit insurance scheme in 1996 were less 
likely to consider it necessary to switch banks. In the 2001 survey, households with 
detailed knowledge of the reinstatement of the deposit insurance cap were more likely 
to consider it necessary to switch banks (Table 6(b)). Second, the results both for 1996 
and for 2001 indicate that the larger a household’s financial assets, the more likely it 
was to switch or to consider it necessary to switch banks. Third, in 2001, households 
with time deposits in excess of 10 million yen saw it especially necessary to switch 
banks, as indicated by the large and significant coefficient on this variable. Fourth, we 
notice that the interaction term for total household assets and the dummy variable for 
ordinary deposits in excess of 10 million yen is not significant while the interaction 
term with time deposits in excess of 10 million yen is positive and significant for 
households that switched or were considering to switch banks. This result suggests that 
households’ bank switching behavior closely responds to changes in the deposit 
insurance scheme: As is only to be expected, households with larger financial assets are 
more inclined to switch banks; but we also find that households with large ordinary 
deposits, which continued to be fully insured until 2005, did not find it necessary to 
switch banks, while those with large time deposits, on which the cap was reinstated in 
2002, did. In other words, the reintroduction of the “pay-off” scheme stimulated 
switching behavior as desired. Finally, most of the other coefficients are not statistically 
significant.  
                                                  
13 We include this variable since some households are not able to switch banks simply because there are 
no alternatives in their vicinity. We also tried to incorporate dummy variables for households’ “old” banks 
(city banks, regional banks, Japan Post and others) to control for bank switching behavior since 
households that have deposits with risky banks are more inclined to shift their deposits. Our dataset 
contains information on each households’ “main bank” but we cannot discern whether this information 
refers to households’ “old” or “new” bank.  13
     In sum, our results show that households with higher levels of income, larger 
financial assets and higher educational attainment tend to be more knowledgeable with 
regard to the deposit insurance scheme or the reinstatement of the “pay-off” scheme. In 
addition, households with knowledge about the deposit insurance scheme and/or larger 
financial assets are more likely to switch banks.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Taking advantage of a comprehensive set of household-level data, this study analyzed 
bank switching behavior in Japan in 1996 and 2001. We explored whether such 
switching behavior was an adequate reflection of banks’ financial health. We also 
examined what determined households’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme.  
We found that bank switching behavior in response to risk was more frequent in 
2001 than in 1996. In both surveys, in more than 80 percent of the cases where 
households switched banks, the “new” financial institution was a city bank or the post 
office. But while in 1996 the “old” bank was a city bank in only 36 percent of the cases, 
in 2001 this figure jumped to almost 60 percent, suggesting that households had become 
much more discerning with regard to the safety of individual city banks.  
This bank switching behavior is in line with banks’ financial health at the time: 
Banks to which households switched their deposits tended to be in a better financial 
condition than households’ “old” bank. We also found that households with higher 
incomes, larger assets, and higher educational attainment were more informed regarding 
the deposit insurance scheme and this better awareness led households with larger 
financial assets to switch banks in 2001.  
  Our findings contain some important policy implications. First, comparing the 
results between the 1996 and 2001 surveys, we clearly observe that depositors were 
more sensitive to bank risk in 2001. Households’ bank switching behavior was closely 
correlated with banks’ financial health and size. In other words, households do “punish” 
weak banks by withdrawing assets and switching them to safer banks.   
The financial sector crisis of the 1990s has clearly exposed the shortcomings of 
Japan’s traditional approach to supervising the financial sector by relying on the 
government alone. The findings of this paper suggest that depositors can potentially 
play an important supplementary role in monitoring banks’ performance. Now that full 
coverage has been lifted and all types of deposits are once again subject to the “pay-off” 
cap, an important next step in strengthening the role of market forces would be to 
improve the transparency of banks’ financial accounts.   14
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Knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme
Knowledge level 2 (detailed knowledge) 0.07 0.25 0.25 0.43
Knowledge level 1 (basic knowledge) 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50
Knowledge level 0 (no knowledge) 0.48 0.50 0.32 0.47
Bank switching behavior
Actually switched 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20
Considering to switch 0.07 0.26 0.27 0.45
Not considering it necessary to switch 0.89 0.31 0.42 0.49
Other 0.27 0.44
45.18 12.40 46.78 13.51
71.95 46.91 67.81 48.03
Detached house owner 0.68 0.47 0.77 0.42
0.92 0.27 0.87 0.34
Junior high school 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29
High school  0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48
Junior college 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
University / Grad school 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50
Financial assets (hundred thousand yen)
Ordinary deposits 9.72 25.71 14.82 29.60
Time deposits 42.13 120.97 33.57 82.04
Postal savings 19.79 39.84 24.01 43.40
Other 28.50 69.34 30.45 84.64
Total financial assets 100.14 185.48 102.86 165.78
The most important reason for choosing a financial institution
Interest rate 0.51 0.50 0.40 0.49
Location, number and opening hours of branches 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42
Service contents 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39
Financial condition 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38
Central Tokyo (23 wards) 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
Outer Tokyo  0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
Saitama prefecture 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38
Chiba prefecture 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38
Kanagawa prefecture 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
Ibaraki prefecture - - 0.01 0.10
Number of observations
Area of residence
Age of  household head
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Educational attainment (household head)
























City banks 36 2 1 5 1 28 2 75
Regional banks 6 1 12 19
Trust banks 8 2 1 14 1 26
Bond issuing banks 2 21 117
Second-tier regional bank 12 1 3 4 20
Credit unions 19 4 2 1 17 1 44
Small and medium banks 91 1 9 2 0
Post office 0
Total of "new" banks 92 7511 1 3 2 8 5 5 2 1 1
"D" rating "E+" rating "E" rating Unknown Total 
" D" rating 2 10 1 1 14 3 1 1 2 16 1 38
" E+" rating 48 43 91 91132 7 3 8 4 42 0 5
"E" rating  15 16 31 2 2 1 1 23 3 63
Total  6 5 6 9 11 1 3 6 1 2 3253 9 51 2 383 0 6
1 7 1 1 3 3 1 2232 1 3 6 3 8 0
551 1 1 26 1 1 1 2 2 3 5
33 1 2 2 8
62 1921 12 9 1 2 5
1 1 1 0 1 2 2 2112 2 4 1 5 3
12 3 1 4 8
11
Postal Savings 0
105 102 6 2 215 18 14 5 12 8 11 5 211 17 516
Small and medium banks
Foreign banks
Total of "new" banks

































Note: 1. Figures in cross-tabulation table indicate numbers of households.





Note: The ratings for the city banks, obtained from Moody’s Kakuzuke Geppo [Moody's Japanese Ratings Guide] (December 2001),  are as follows:
ɹɹɹɹɹD       Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.
ɹɹɹɹɹE+ɹɹSanwa Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Tokai Bank, Fuji Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation.





Total assets (trillion yenʣ 24.977 51.905 *** 61 23.429 53.073 *** 65
Liquidity-asset ratio (%) 12.309 14.246 61 9.769 12.921 *** 65
Operating profit ratio (%) 0.726 0.857 *** 61 0.679 0.768 63
Nonperforming loan ratio (%) 4.596 2.590 *** 59 4.604 2.611 *** 65






Total assets (trillion yenʣ 46.166 66.464 *** 178 42.385 62.072 *** 178
Liquidity-asset ratio (%) 13.054 16.049 *** 178 15.190 16.316 *** 178
Operating profit ratio (%) 0.675 0.529 *** 178 0.657 0.627 178
Nonperforming loan ratio (%) 6.653 7.193 178 8.530 8.320 178
Capital-asset ratio (%) 11.234 11.356 * 177 10.326 10.512 ** 178
Growth rate of all deposits -1.908 2.615 ** 59 3.693 6.193 *** 178
Growth rate of ordinary deposits 0.123 3.680 *** 59 57.861 56.362 178
Growth rate of time deposits 2.677 0.701 59 -18.533 -16.482 ** 178
FY1995-FY1996 FY2000-FY2001





Notes:  1ɽ Households which did not indicate their "old" and/or "new" bank were removed from the sample.
ɹɹɹ    2.  ***, ** and * denote that the null hypothesis that the difference between two sample means is equal to zero is rejected at  the 1, 5








[Knowledge = 2] Had detailed knowledge of the insurance scheme 10 17 137 164  
[Knowledge = 1] Knew of the deposit insurance scheme 45 94 980 1119
[Knowledge = 0] Did not know about the deposit insurance scheme 30 68 1072 1170









[Knowledge = 2] Had detailed knowledge of the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap 53 236 286 23 598  
[Knowledge = 1] Knew of the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap 39 343 531 147 1060
[Knowledge = 0] Did not know about the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap 6 84 210 507 807
Total 98 663 1027 677 2465
Table 4(a): Households' knowledge regarding the deposit insurance scheme and bank switching behavior  (1996ʣ
Table 4(b):  Households' knowledge regarding the reintroduction of the deposit insurance cap and bank switching behavior (2001)
Note: Figures in the cross-tabulation table indicate the number of households.









Age (household head) 0.0000 0.0023 -0.0001 0.0046 0.0001 0.0064
Age
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
Annual income (million yen) 0.0028 0.0009 *** 0.0061 0.0017 *** -0.0089 0.0022 ***
Detached house owner 0.0073 0.0075 0.0156 0.0151 -0.0228 0.0209
Employed (household head) -0.0179 0.0142 -0.0384 0.0288 0.0563 0.0397
Educational attainment (household head)
Junior high school -0.0401 0.0133 *** -0.0860 0.0251 *** 0.1261 0.0338 ***
Junior college  -0.0005 0.0119 -0.0010 0.0241 0.0014 0.0336
University / Grad school 0.0297 0.0088 *** 0.0636 0.0163 *** -0.0932 0.0213 ***
Total financial assets (million yen) 0.0008 0.0002 *** 0.0018 0.0003 *** -0.0026 0.0004 ***












Age (household head) 0.0093 0.0042 ** 0.0017 0.0026 -0.0110 0.0048 **
Age
2 -0.0001 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 *
Annual income (million) 0.0051 0.0014 *** 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0061 0.0016 ***
Detached house owner 0.0333 0.0170 ** 0.0059 0.0104 -0.0392 0.0196 **
Employed (household head) -0.0782 0.0276 *** -0.0140 0.0179 0.0922 0.0317 ***
Junior high school -0.1103 0.0287 *** -0.0197 0.0200 0.1300 0.0322 ***
Junior college  0.0020 0.0254 0.0004 0.0147 -0.0024 0.0296
University / Grad school 0.1317 0.0177 *** 0.0236 0.0174 -0.1552 0.0191 ***
Total financial asset (million) 0.0004 0.0001 *** 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0001 ***
Number of observations = 2351
McFadden’s pseudo R
2 =0.091
Table 5(a): Determinants of knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme (1996)
Knowledge=2 Knowledge=1 Knowledge=0
Educational attainment (household head)
Table 5-2: Determinants of knowledge of the reinstatement of the deposit insurance cap (2001)
Knowledge=2 Knowledge=1 Knowledge=0
Note: 1. We employed an order probit model. ***, ** and * denote that the null hypothesis that the estimated marginal effect is equal to zero
               is rejected at the 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively.
          2. The base case for educational attainment is "high school" and that for area of residence is Central Tokyo (23 wards). The coefficients
              on the area of residence were insignificant and are omitted from this table to conserve space.









Age (household head) 0.0023 0.0023 0.0033 0.0028  -0.0057 0.0049
Age
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001
Household annual income (million yen) -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0010  0.0014 0.0017
Detached house owner 0.0012 0.0016 0.0017 0.0020  -0.0029 0.0035
Employed (household head) -0.0002 0.0113 -0.0003 0.0143  0.0006 0.0250
Junior high school  0.0079 0.0110 0.0112 0.0135   -0.0190 0.0239
Junior college  0.0131 0.0110 0.0186 0.0131   -0.0317 0.0233
University / Grad school 0.0043 0.0070   0.0061 0.0086   -0.0104 0.0153
Financial assets (million yen) 0.0005 0.0002 ** 0.0007 0.0002 *** -0.0012 0.0005 ***
Ordinary deposits>=10 million yen -0.0967 0.0869   -0.1372 0.1051   0.2339 0.1859  
Time deposits>=10 million yen 0.0125 0.0114   0.0178 0.0135   -0.0303 0.0241  
Knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme
Knowledge = 2 (detailed knowledge) 0.0048 0.0117   0.0068 0.0147   -0.0115 0.0258  
Knowledge = 0 (no knowledge) -0.0110 0.0073   -0.0155 0.0083 * 0.0265 0.0150 *
The most important reason for choosing a financial institution
Location, number and opening hours
of branches
-0.0112 0.0087   -0.0159 0.0102  0.0271 0.0183  
Service contents -0.0048 0.0093 -0.0067 0.0116  0.0115 0.0204
Financial condition 0.0056 0.0089 0.0079 0.0111  -0.0135 0.0195
Number of observations = 2445
McFadden’s pseudo R
2 =0.041
Not considering it necessary to
switch
Table 6(a): Determinants of bank switching behavior (1996)
Educational attainment (household head)
Actually switched  Considering to switch
Note: 1. We employed an order probit model. ***, ** and * denote that the null hypothesis that the estimated marginal effect is equal to zero
               is rejected at the 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively.
          2. The base case for educational attainment is "high school"  and that for area of residence is central Tokyo (23 wards). The coefficients on
              the area of residence were insignificant and are omitted from this table to conserve space. The base case for the most important









Age (household head) 0.0013 0.0022   0.0038 0.0053   -0.0050 0.0066
Age
2 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001
Household annual income (million yen) 0.0005 0.0008   0.0015 0.0019   -0.0019 0.0024
Detached house owner 0.0007 0.0098   0.0020 0.0239   -0.0026 0.0297
Employed (household head) -0.0086 0.0118   -0.0256 0.0287   0.0342 0.0356
Junior high school  -0.0068 0.0153   -0.0202 0.0374   0.0269 0.0464
Junior college  0.0083 0.0139   0.0246 0.0336   -0.0329 0.0418
University / Grad school 0.0051 0.0084   0.0152 0.0202   -0.0203 0.0252
Financial assets (million yen) 0.0012 0.0003 *** 0.0037 0.0006 *** -0.0049 0.0006 ***
Ordinary deposits>=10 million yen 0.0145 0.0216   0.0430 0.0521   -0.0574 0.0646  
Time deposits>=10 million yen 0.0511 0.0182 *** 0.1518 0.0352 *** -0.2029 0.0399 ***
Knowledge regarding the reinstatement of the deposit insurance cap
Knowledge = 2 (detailed knowledge) 0.0112 0.0086   0.0331 0.0204   -0.0443 0.0250 *
Knowledge = 0 (no knowledge) -0.0134 0.0112   -0.0397 0.0262   0.0530 0.0325  
The most important reason for choosing a financial institution
Lower fees 0.0091 0.0105   0.0269 0.0253   -0.0360 0.0314  
Location, number and opening hours
of branches
0.0018 0.0098  0.0052 0.0239   -0.0070 0.0297  
Service contents 0.0081 0.0096   0.0241 0.0232   -0.0322 0.0288  
Number of observations = 1756
McFadden’s pseudo R
2 =0.088
Educational attainment (household head)
Considering to switch
Table 6(b): Determinants of bank switching behavior (2001)
Actually switched 
Not considering it necessary
to switch
Notes: See Table 6(a).